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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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11	D. TORRES,	CASE NO. CV 12-7298 CAS (RZ)
12	Petitioner,	ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING SUCCESSIVE HABEAS ACTION
13	vs.	
14	JAMES D. HARTLEY, Warden,	
15	Respondent.	
16	;	
17	Daniel Torres presents a habeas petition that is successive and lacks the	
18	required Court of Appeals authorization for such a petition. The Court will dismiss the	
19	petition and the action summarily for lack of jurisdiction to entertain it.	
20	Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States	
21	District Courts provides that "[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any	
22	exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the	
23	judge shall make an order for its summary dismissal and cause the petitioner to be	
24	notified."	
25	Section 2244 of Title 28, part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty	
26	Act, requires that the district court dismiss most successive habeas corpus petitions:	
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- (b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.
- (2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless
 - (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
 - (B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
 - (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
- (3)(A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.

. . .

In *Felker v. Turpin*, 518 U.S. 651, 656-57, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 135 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1996), the Supreme Court noted that this statute transferred the screening function for successive petitions from the district court to the court of appeals. This provision has been held to be jurisdictional. That is, the district court cannot entertain a successive petition without prior approval from the Court of Appeals. *Cooper v. Calderon*, 274 F.3d 1270,

1274 (9th Cir. 2001). The district court therefore either must dismiss a successive petition 1 for lack of jurisdiction, or it may transfer the action, in the interest of justice, to the court 2 where the action properly could have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1631; Pratt v. United 3 States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997). 4 Earlier this year, Petitioner filed a habeas action challenging his December 5 2010 denial of parole, just as he does in the current action. The Court denied the prior 6 petition on the merits because relief was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's ruling in 7 Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 859, 178 L. Ed. 2d 732 (2011). See generally 8 docket in *Torres v. Hartley*, Case No. CV 12-5703 CAS (RZ). 9 Petitioner's current petition does not enjoy the required Ninth Circuit 10 authorization for successive petitions. No factors appear which make it preferable to 11 transfer this case to the Court of Appeals, rather than dismissing it. 12 Accordingly, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 13 14 **DATED:** August 29, 2012 15 Rhristins a. Smyde 16 17 CHRISTINA A. SNYDER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28